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1 The enumeration of positive reports does not pretend to be complete. For an overview of more positive reports, see Bundesministerium des Innern (2006) . The critical assessment of the effects of the World Cup by Brenke and Wagner (2007) came to the author´s attention after the manuscript had been written.
WP 10/2007 -One year later 2 aggregate possible increases in the profits and incomes of individuals with the losses of others, and thereby present an overall economic picture.
Numbers and prices of overnight stays
The number of overnight stays in Germany in June 2006 was some 1.6 million higher than in the same month of the previous year; in July the increase amounted to 0.6 million. However, for many reasons it is questionable to attribute this to the soccer World Cup. For one thing, the preceding year might turn out to have been particularly weak.
For another, there has in any case been a slightly positive growth in the number of overnight stays in Germany over the past ten years; they have risen from 23.9 million (visitors from within Germany or from other countries) in 1997 to 27.6 million in 2006, which corresponds to an annual growth of 1.4%. The broken line in Figure 1 shows the growth in overnight stays in German hotels for 1997-2006 on the basis of the raw data.
It is at once obvious that the overnight numbers show seasonal fluctuation, and it is therefore useful to perform the analysis with the help of seasonally adjusted data. With regard to the trend observed for Germany as a whole, the corresponding seasonally adjusted values ( Fig Source: Statistisches Bundesamt: Entwicklung der Ankünfte und Übernachtungen in Beherbergungsstätten, in: Fachserie 6, Reihe 7.1.
However, although the increases in the numbers of overnight stays were not statistically significant, the hotel sector compensated with prices 4.8% higher than those in June
2005
. Even though Figure 3 shows that the price rise remained in place after the World Cup (and therefore could be attributed to other causes such as the general upswing in Germany), this might have contributed to the fact that 41% of hoteliers nevertheless felt their (positive) expectations of the World Cup to have been realized 3 .
Effects on retail trade
Some reports have recorded increases in the retail sector of some €2 milliard based on the World Cup. Figure 4 , which represents the percent change in retail sales figures compared with the previous year, reveals that the World Cup months of June and July 4 2006 were characterized by decreases (!) in turnover. 4 It must be borne in mind that these numbers do not include possible increases in sales at filling stations and in the field of fan celebrations (which, however, were partly cancelled out by catering losses in other regions): just as already observed for other sporting mega-events, many consumers might have been diverted from their normal consumption behaviour by the World Cup itself, or by what they saw in the stadiums, in the 'Fan-Mile' street markets or on television. Or they chose -and this is an exaggeration -to entertain themselves very well at home by watching the live broadcasts of the soccer and restricting themselves to the consumption of fast food (the 'couch potato' effect). 
Income from international tourism
The previously reported data regarding consumption and accommodation do not differentiate between the activities of German residents and those of people from other coun-tries. However, analyses of sports events should evaluate the expenditure exclusively of non-residents as an impulse to the economy of the host region. As for the people from within Germany itself, it can be assumed that their increased expenditure during the sporting event is counterbalanced by reductions in their consumption elsewhere and that the savings rate overall remains constant at least in the medium term (Maennig 1998) .
It is worth taking a look at the statistics of the service balance sheet, in which the ex- The above-mentioned €1.5 milliard increase in receipts at first appears to be considerable, but must once again be put into perspective in several ways. First, this sum in the order of milliards corresponds to only 0.07% (!) of the gross domestic product for Germany in 2006. Although this is not of itself an argument against the economic effectiveness of the soccer World Cup, it does emphasize that in a large national economy any impulses are rapidly condemned to statistical insignificance. Hence, it must be emphasized once more that the above-mentioned rise (corresponding to some 22.5% compared with the same period in the previous year) should be considered against the background of the gradual positive trend that is occurring in any case in receipts from international tourism. Between 1997 and 2005, i.e. disregarding any World Cup effect, the average growth in receipts from international tourism amounted in any case to ~5.1% per year.
In addition one must ask, as already discussed, whether at the same time there were counterbalancing effects of the World Cup, so that the net effect for the balance sheet for tourism turns out to be less positive. 
Employment effect
The national labour agency reports 25,000 to 50,000 additional jobs arising from the hard to find. 6 It must again be borne in mind that in the larger economies any impulse is rapidly consigned to insignificance.
All together, it must be taken as an interim result that most of the effects on turnovers of retail business, tourism and employment that feature in the foreground of discussions about the economics of the soccer World Cup (and other major sporting events) turn out, at least in the short term, to be smaller than supposed. It is not at present possible to determine whether there will be positive medium-or long-term effects of the 2006
World Cup on the host cities; however, on the grounds of empirical studies of comparable sporting events it appears at least that they cannot be guaranteed. 
World Cup stadiums, novelty effect and urban development
Following on from this first disappointing interim balance sheet, consideration should be given to the likelihood of positive effects in other areas that are frequently given less attention in descriptions of the 2006 World Cup, for example because they are presumed to be negative or less satisfactorily quantifiable.
It is worth beginning with construction works. The expenditure on the stadiums in which the World Cup was held reached more than €1.4 milliard (Feddersen et al., 2006) . In addition, investments in the related infrastructure amounted to nearly €2 milliard (Maennig and Buettner, 2007 phere, in particular better accommodation for VIPs and business contacts. However, the architect's copyright, the needs of monument protection, and the wish to preserve the athletics track all contributed to the impossibility of undertaking improvements to the Olympic stadium.
Although the two clubs were ready to bear the cost of the new building themselves, public support was initially weak on account of concerns over a future largely unused Costs (of stadiums) should be seen as the portion of use of resources that arises through the production of a given product in a specified period (here, the World Cup in June/July 2006). The World Cup and other events generate costs because they (can) contribute to the wear and tear of the stadium, which is normally written off as deprecia- On the other hand, in Germany the opportunity was missed to aim not only for an optimization of the management efficiency of the professional clubs, but also for a particularly attractive, spectacular, 'iconic' architecture of the stadium to create an urban impulse in each city, with which the process of development of each region could have 12 been accelerated (Maennig 2006) . The architecture of the German 'World Cup' stadiums overall can be described as 'functional', while freely conceding that many technical innovations and creative architectural ideas are bound up in the stadiums. It must also be recognized that the beauty and attractiveness (also) of stadiums lies always in the eyes of the (loving) beholders. Nevertheless, there are no unique new constructions and iconic architectural features with trans-regional significance -except for the Munich arena. This, however, had to be situated too far from the city centre to generate a positive effect for Munich in the foreseeable future.
9
There is no standard definition of 'iconic buildings' 10 , but there are plenty of examples among the structures that have been built: the Sydney Opera House is inseparable from the worldwide image of that city, and the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao, which has given its name to the 'Bilbao effect' that is so lacking in the German stadiums, has converted that Spanish city, which hitherto went largely unnoticed on the international scene, into one of the five most visited cities of Spain. There are even examples within sports architecture: the Munich Olympic Stadium with its architecture has become one of the best-known symbols of Munich and is still drawing visitors to the city.
Meanwhile the effect of 'iconic' architecture is valued worldwide, and in many cities it is one of the most important parts of that city's development strategy. In Germany on the other hand, the subject is still little considered, including for other areas than sports complexes. Admittedly, Hamburg has now chosen, with its projected Elbe Philharmonic
Hall, what is acknowledged to be a striking architectural design, in order to redress the perceived shortcoming that, although the name of the city is familiar worldwide, people generally have no mental pictures of the city. And Frankfurt has meanwhile established an explicit requirement for 'spectacular projects' (N.N. 2007d). There are, incidentally, also plenty of international examples of iconic stadium projects.
11
The club managers should not be blamed; they have the task of maximizing the income for their teams. For this, they must confine their endeavours to whatever is necessary to keep the fans happy. It is not their business to participate in municipal or regional politics, to make their architecture interesting from the point of view of the cityscape and to achieve 'external' effects for the regional economy, from which their budgets do not profit. Responsibility would have rested with the local authorities and their policy makers, who would have had to bear the additional costs of ambitious architecture (and, where applicable, the better location). Nota bene: the Munich Arena cost about €280 million, whereas the average for the rest of the World Cup stadiums was about €100 million. Considering the restricted public funds and the attitude increasingly encountered in the population that one should not give more public financial support to soccer 'millionaires', this would hardly have pleased the politicians. So the German World
Cup stadiums were about 75% privately financed, if one excludes the two historicalpolitical stadiums in Berlin and Leipzig -and were accordingly reduced to 'soccer functionalities'. To that extent, the voters themselves bear the responsibility for the missed opportunity to boost a city's development.
International perception of Germany and the feelgood effect for German residents
As a result of the World Cup, the perception of Germany has risen in other countries. 13 Johnson and Whitehead (2000) , however, study the willingness of people to pay for two stadium projects in Lexington, Kentucky, even if they do not visit the stadiums. Atkinson et al (2006) evaluate the British WTP for the Olympic Games in London 2012.
(willingness to pay), to evaluate this phenomenon of benefiting from (sports) events without active attendance at the stadium -a concept usually somewhat misleadingly termed in the sports economics literature the 'non-use effect'. Before the World Cup, only one out of five Germans had a 'willingness to pay' (WTP) for the World Cup to take place in Germany that differed from zero (Heyne et al., 2007) . On average, the WTP was €4.26 per person, which with 82 million inhabitants corresponds to ~€351.5 million. After the World Cup 42.6% had a positive WTP, and the average was €10.0, amounting to €830.8 million for the whole country. Since only a few of the 82 million Germans themselves had tickets to attend a stadium for a World Cup match, the willingness to pay can be interpreted as a 'non-use effect'. These effects are often called 'intangibles', yet they are perfectly quantifiable and they were among the largest effects of the World Cup. Heyne et al. (2007) report that the increase in the willingness to pay is attributable above all to a change of attitude in those who, before the World Cup, were not willing to pay anything. After the World Cup, an increased willingness to pay was expressed particularly among East Germans, but also among low-skilled persons. Heyne et al. conclude that major sporting events have a characteristic 'experience value'; consumers cannot correctly estimate the quality of an event before their first experience of it, and hence cannot predict their willingness to pay for it.
Summary
The long-term economic effects of the soccer World Cup, such as from the improved image, can not yet be evaluated after only one year. In certain areas -the development strategies of the cities were singled out -there have at any rate been opportunities for optimization, with which the long-term benefits would have been increased. But wisdom comes with hindsight, and the responsibility does not lie with the organizers of the World Cup.
The preceding analysis, restricted to the short-term effects, has shown that the impulses in retail business, tourism and employment, which are frequently in the forefront of any proposals for major sporting events, may indeed have been partly positive; however, they were not sufficient to have had any overall economic significance. For some sectors such as the retail trade there may even have been negative developments -contrary to the official perceptions of this sector.
For many people this is a disappointing outcome in terms of the 'pecuniary' effects, but it must be added that the economic costs of the 2006 World Cup, too, were low enough to be disregarded; only a negligible proportion of the costs of stadium construction and infrastructure should be apportioned to the soccer World Cup.
The greatest effect of the 2006 World Cup occurred in aspects that for a long time have not received much attention in economic analyses, because they were mistakenly regarded either as not quantifiable and/or even as non-economic effects. The willingness to pay of the German public for the 'non-use effects' such as the feelgood effects and the improved international perception of Germany, however, amounted almost to the order of milliards; hence these effects are the greatest measurable effects of the 2006
World Cup. Greater willingness to pay for a sporting event or for other events in Germany has, as far as the author knows, not hitherto been recorded. In this respect, it is established that from an economic point of view the 2006 soccer World Cup was one of the greatest and economically most important events in Germany.
To end on a positive note, mention must be made of a reported increase in the birth rate nine months after the soccer World Cup -anecdotal, although not yet statistically confirmed. The World Cup is seen as the cause, because many people in Germany were led by the relaxed, happy atmosphere of the World Cup to forget their cares and stresses …
